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ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF DID NOT RAISE ISSUES REGARDING RULE 37 BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND DID NOT ALLOW THE TRIAL COURT TO
CONSIDER OR RULE ON THIS ISSUE.
The Utah Court of Appeals stated that "Defendants provided very little legal or factual

arguments, either at the district court or on appeal, regarding whether they followed the
proper procedures pursuant to rules 34 and 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Rahofy
v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350, ^ 5, fn.6,245 P.3d 201. Relying on this language, Plaintiff,
in her appellate brief, states that the Court of Appeals "found that the Defendants did not
establish, or even attempt to establish, before the district court that they served Plaintiff with
a document request in compliance with Rule 34(a)(1) of the Utah R. Civ. P,"p. 15. Plaintiff
points out that "[t]he record does not include any Requests for Production of Documents
served by Defendants," p. 1 5 \ Plaintiff then claims that "the Court of Appeals correctly
found that Defendants' Request for Production of Documents are not part of the record and
further that Defendants failed to request the documents at issue pursuant to the discovery
rules," p. 16.
Defendant has sought to enlarge the record on appeal to demonstrate that, in fact,
Requests for Production of Documents were served at the trial court level. It seems odd that
Plaintiff would object to Defendants' efforts to establish before the appellate courts that
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents were, in fact, served at the trial
court level.

defendants have asked this Court to allow the record to be supplemented to
allow the Court to consider the Interrogatories and Requests for Production.

Further, Plaintiff's reliance on the absence of the Requests for Production of
Documents in the record is even more curious when, as acknowledged by Plaintiff, the issues
she now relies on (applicability of Rule 37) and the issues which formed the foundation of
the Court of Appeals decision, were never discussed in memoranda nor argument before the
trial court. Plaintiff acknowledged this fact in her initial brief to the Court of Appeals:
Plaintiff concedes that Rule 37 and its requirements were never discussed in
memoranda or argument related to Defendants' Motion to Compel.
Plaintiff's brief, p. 28.
Despite this acknowledgment that alleged failure to comply with Rule 37 was never
raised before the trial court, Plaintiff now seeks to perpetuate the misunderstanding of the
record because she raised on appeal, for the first time, the issue regarding alleged failure to
comply with Rule 37.
II.

AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL, THE ISSUES PRESENTED DEALT WITH
THE SCOPE OF THE RECORDS REQUESTED, NOT THE PROCESS.
The issues presented to the trial court dealt with Defendants' right to seek Plaintiff's

prior medical and employment records. Plaintiff claimed the efforts to obtain Plaintiff's
medical records were an invasion of her privacy (R. 233, Transcript, p. 2), that the medical
and employment records were "irrelevant" ("We've already - - like I said, we've provided
them what - - everything we believe to be related to the collision. ..") (R. 233, Transcript, p.
3), and that Plaintiff "still holds the privilege. She (not the trial court) gets to make that
decision whether those are going to be released." (R. 233, Transcript, p. 5).

Emphasis

added. Plaintiff did not claim confusion as to what records Defendants sought to obtain.
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Plaintiff did not object (at that time) to the procedure which had been followed to seek the
records or to bring the issue before the trial court. Instead the argument before the trial court
and, ultimately the trial court's ruling, addressed the specific issues presented to the trial
court for consideration.
The trial court determined, given the nature of the claims asserted, that the medical
and employment records were subject to production. The trial court indicated, as far as the
employment records are concerned, Defendants are entitled to obtain all employment records
- including "access to whatever the defendant wants to spend the time looking for." The trial
court correctly held that there is no "employment record privilege" and that Defendants
could request Plaintiff's prior employment records even "back to when she was selling
cookies when she was - - Girl Scout cookies."

(R. 233, Transcript, p. 12). "They

[Defendants] may very well be wasting their time, but it's their time they're wasting." (R.
233, Transcript, p. 12).
Regarding medical records, the trial court recognized that certain records may be
protected from disclosure.

"I fully agree with the plaintiff's position that there may be

(medical) records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't know that until
I see them. " (R.233, Transcript, p. 13). The trial court established a procedure whereby it
could review records to which a continuing privilege against disclosure was claimed.
If Plaintiff had complaints with the method which Defendants had employed to seek
the trial court's review of its efforts to obtain records, or if Plaintiff objected to Defendant's
efforts to obtain signed authorizations for records, those complaints could have been (and

should have been) directed to the trial court first - to allow the trial court (and Defendants)
to address those issues then. Plaintiff made no such objection to the trial court, as she
acknowledged in her initial brief to the Court of Appeals, but only focused on the scope of
the discovery.
III.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY SOUGHT TO INTRUDE
ON THE BROAD DISCRETIONARY POWERS VESTED IN THE TRIAL
COURT REGARDING DISCOVERY MATTERS.
The Court of Appeals in Rahofyjoy

reversing the trial court's order granting

Defendants' Motion to Compel, has improperly sought to encroach upon the trial court's
discretion in discovery matters. This Court has previously held that trial courts have broad
discretion regarding discovery matters. R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 936
P.2d 1068, (Utah 1997).
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that "Defendants must establish their entitlement
using the proper procedures." Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350 H 11. In fact,
Defendants did present the trial court with the basis for their claims, the nature of the records
requested, and the procedure employed to obtain those records.
Plaintiffs sought information and documents pursuant to Rule 33 and 34, Utah R. Civ.
Proc.

The Court of Appeals incorrectly stated in Rahofy that "Rahofy responded to

Defendant's motion [to compel] by arguing that... the request to sign the authorizations was
an informal request...". Rahofy, % 3. A review of Plaintiff's memorandum opposing
Defendants' Motion to Compel ( R. 83-96) and the transcript of the oral argument on
defendants' Motion to Compel ( R. 233) shows this argument was not raised by Plaintiff
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before the trial court. The focus on the dispute regarding the employment and medical
authorizations was on the scope of the discovery requested, not the procedure.
The Court of Appeals claimed that "Defendants attempted to avoid the requirements
of rules 34 and 37 by arguing that the authorizations were the only way to access certain
records because those records are located outside of Utah." Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT
App. 350 T| 11. In point of fact, Defendants did not attempt to avoid the requirements of Rule
34 - but sought to obtain records pursuant to Rule 33 and 34.
While Rule 37 deals with a trial court's authority to order a party to cooperate in
discovery, Defendants had already requested Plaintiff to provide a copy of her pre-accident
medical records pursuant to Ut. R. Civ. P. 34, but she failed/refused to do so. Defendants
then prepared authorizations and requested Plaintiff to sign them so Defendants could obtain
her medical and employment records directly. Rather than sign the authorizations, Plaintiff
claimed that she had complied with the requirements of Rule 33 and Rule 34 by providing
documents she actually had in her possession.
In considering Defendants' Motion to Compel, the trial court properly exercised its
discretion under Rule 37 and properly ordered Plaintiff to sign the authorizations, since the
records sought by Defendants were within Plaintiff's "control," as discussed more fully
below.
Additionally, the trial court's Order regarding Defendants' Motion to Compel, was
not a sanction against Plaintiff - the trial court simply applied its broad discretion in
overseeing the discovery process. Rather, the trial court had authority under Rule 37 to grant

Defendants' Motion to Compel Plaintiff to sign the authorizations as part of its inherent
power to oversee and implement discovery procedures.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SIGN THE MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT
RECORDS AUTHORIZATIONS ENABLING DEFENDANTS TO OBTAIN
HER OUT-OF-STATE MEDICAL AND EMPLOYMENT RECORDS.
The Court of Appeals held that the request by Defendants to have Plaintiff sign

authorizations to allow them to obtain the requested records "circumvented the discovery
rules."

Rahofy v. Steadman, 2010 UT App. 350 \ 12.

Defendants did not seek to

"circumvent the discovery rules", but to use them to obtain records which were clearly
relevant.
Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Proc. states:
(a) Scope. Any party may serve on any other party a request:
(a)(1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting
on his behalf, to inspect, copy, test or sample any designated documents . . .
which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which
are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request
is served; or. . .
Plaintiff claimed that she had fulfilled her obligation by producing all of the
documents within her possession and/or custody. R. 233, Transcript,p. 3. However, Plaintiff
owes a duty to produce documents also within her control.
The term "control," in the context of Rule 34, Utah R. Civ. Proc. is to be broadly
construed. The critical inquiry is whether there is access to the records sought. Even if
records are sought from a non-party, if the records sought are within the party's ability to
obtain the records, the records are subject to discovery. U.E. ex.relBranch Consultants, LLC
6

v. Allstate Ins. Co., Slip Copy WL 3522958 (E.D. La. 2010); F.D.LC. v. Halpern, 271 F.R.D.
191,2010 WL 4237950 (D.New. 2010);ML Hawley Ins. Co. v. Felman Production, Inc., 269
F.R.D. 609, 2010 WL 3294389 (S.D.W. Va. 2010); Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nebraska Beef,
Inc., Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1553458 (D. Neb. 2010).
A party may have "control" over documents even where it does not have entitlement
to the documents if it has the "practical ability to obtain" them. See, e.g., In reNTL, Inc. Sec.
Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y 2007). "The concept of 'control' has been
construed broadly. Under Rule 34, 'control 5 does not require that the party have legal
ownership or actual physical possession of the documents at issue; rather, documents are
considered to be under a party's control when that party has the right, authority, or practical
ability to obtain the documents from the non-party. . ." Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Vecsey,
259 F.R.D.23, 2009 WL 2781099 (D. Conn. 2009).
In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., Slip Copy, 2011 WL
3418226, (N.D. Okl. 2011) the Court noted: "'Control' comprehends not only possession but
also the right, authority, or ability to obtain the documents. Rule 34 performs the same
salutary function of creating access to documentation in an economical

and

expeditious

fashion by requiring a party to produce relevant records not in its physical possession when
the records can be obtained easily from a third party source." (Emphasis added). [See, also,
Forbes v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 258 F.R.D. 335, 2008 WL 2347327 (D.Ariz 2009) for
proposition that requests may be "through informal requests."] Control is defined as the legal

right to obtain documents upon demand.

U.S. v. Intl

Union of Petroleum and Indust.

Workers, AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
Here, the trial court properly determined the records requested by Defendants were
within Plaintiff's "control." She could allow access to the records by simply executing
authorizations. The trial court correctly ordered Plaintiff to sign the employment records
authorizations and sign the authorizations for those records which Plaintiff did not assert a
privacy privilege.
V.

REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EXECUTE AUTHORIZATIONS DOES NOT
ALLOW DEFENDANTS TO HAVE "UNFETTERED ACCESS" TO
PLAINTIFF'S RECORDS.
Plaintiff claims Defendants' request for her to sign the authorizations is improper

because the authorizations would give Defendants "unfettered access to Plaintiff's entire
medical history." R. p. 89. This allegation is not accurate.
The trial court, after hearing oral argument from the parties regarding Defendants'
Motion to Compel, properly ruled that Plaintiff was to provide to the Court and Defendants
a list of her medical providers and, include a description of the medical issue which was
presented to the provider. The trial court instructed Plaintiff "You don't have to go into any
detail, but just that much information." R. 233, Transcript, pp. 12-13.
The trial court also gave Plaintiff an opportunity to object to specific records which
Plaintiff believes are not relevant to the case and should not be disclosed to the Defendants.
R. 233, Transcript, p. 13. The trial court then gave Defendants the opportunity to file a
motion with the Court to review the records to which Plaintiff claimed a privilege, and the
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Court would review the records in camera and make a determination as to whether or not the
records should be disclosed. R. 233, Transcript, pp. 13-15. The trial court would determine
whether Defendants have a right to receive and review the records.
VL

IF THIS COURT DETERMINES TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE
SCOPE OF THE AUTHORIZATIONS (WHICH IS A TRIAL COURT
FUNCTION) THIS COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THAT THE
AUTHORIZATIONS ARE APPROPRIATE.
The Court of Appeals in Rahofy, supra, indicated "We make no determination as to

whether the medical and employment records are relevant or privileged. We also need not
make any determination as to the appropriate method for obtaining authorizations for release
of records except as stated herein." Id. at f 11, fn. 10.
Plaintiff claims that the records requested are not related to the conditions at issue, that
Defendants failed to make a showing with "reasonable certainty" that evidence favorable to
Defendants' claims exist and that the trial court incorrectly shifted "the burden to Plaintiffs'
to produce her medical records.
In the event this Court decides to address the merits of Defendants' position regarding
the employment and medical authorizations (which issues were not certified by this Court for
appeal) Defendants present the following:
Utah law is clear there is no privilege pertaining to any communication which is
"relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any . . . defense." Utah Rules of
Evidence, § 506(d)(1). Therefore, there is no privilege to Plaintiff's medical records in

connection with any claims related to her injuries she alleges she sustained in the present
accident.
A.

The only records Plaintiff has produced to date are records generated
after the present accident - records which Plaintiff alleges verify her
personal injury claims.

Plaintiff claimed in her brief to the Court of Appeals that "Plaintiff has already
provided to the defendants all known medical records related to the treatment received by
Plaintiff as a result of the collision." Plaintiff's Brief to Court of Appeals, p. 14. It is telling
that Plaintiff did not state she has produced any records which pre-existed the accident, only
that she has produced records which she feels are related to treatment she received "as a
result of the collision." Further, Plaintiff's counsel told the trial court during oral argument
on Defendants' Motion to Compel " . . . [W]e gave them everything we believe to be
relevant, but now they want more than that." R. 233, Transcript, p. 5, (emphasis added).
It is not Plaintiff's prerogative to make the determination whether the medical records
requested by defendants are relevant.
Plaintiff also cites Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 Utah 8, 177 P.3 614, for support that
her medical records need not be provided. Plaintiff's Supreme Court Brief, p. 33. However,
Sorenson clearly directs that Plaintiff is not in control of what records are to be produced to
Defendants. The Utah Supreme Court, in Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 Utah 8, % 24 stated:
Such information may still be obtained through traditional forms of formal
discovery. Our holding should not be construed as putting the patient in
control of what medical information is made available to opposing counsel and
what is kept private. Making this information available through formal
methods of discovery strikes a balance between enabling the patient to protect
confidential medical information that has no relevance to the civil action and
10

providing the patient's adversary access to information that is relevant to a
condition placed at issue in the case.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in ordering Plaintiff to identify her
prior medical providers and sign authorizations enabling Defendants (subject to trial court
in camera review, if necessary) to obtain her prior medical records.
B.

The trial court properly ruled that after Plaintiff identified her medical
records and the type of treatment she received, Defendants could examine
the list of providers and, if necessary, file a motion with the trial court
requesting an in camera review of the records which Plaintiff claims are
privileged.

The trial court ordered that within 30 days after receiving the list of Plaintiff's medical
providers identifying the doctor and type of medical treatment she received, Defendants
could object to any specific records identified by Plaintiff as records to which she claims a
specific privilege, and to identify specifically why the record should not be produced.
Defendants, if they disagreed with the objection, would then be entitled to file a motion with
the court for an in camera review of the records to determine whether the disputed records
are discoverable. As the trial court judge correctly stated "I fully agree with the Plaintiff's
position that there may be records that are irrelevant and shouldn't be disclosed, but I don't
know that until I see them." R. 233, Transcript, p. 13.
In Henricksen v. State, 84 P.3rd 38, 48-49 (Montana 2004), the Montana Supreme
Court reversed a trial court's decision to prevent the defendant from obtaining plaintiff's
mental and medical health records. The plaintiff in that case argued because she provided
her doctors with complete copies of her disputed medical records, and the doctors stated the
records showed no causal connection between any prior injury or condition and her current
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injuries, this ended the inquiry into the medical records. The plaintiff in Henriksen also
argued that the defendant should be denied access to the records because the defendant did
not present any expert medical opinion that plaintiff's alleged injuries were more probably
than not caused by some other factor than her claimed cause of action. In rejecting this
argument, the Henriksen Court stated: "The fallacy in this argument is that there is no way
that the State [defendant] couldhave provided this opinion because it was denied access to
the very records which would have enabled it to make this determination. The [trial] court's
denial of these records only allowed for a one sided view review of the medical records by
. . . [plaintiffs'] physicians." The Henriksen further opined "[Defendant]... was prejudiced
when it was denied the right to defend itself in an informed matter. It had the right to
discover evidence related to prior physical or mental conditions possibly connected to . . .
[plaintiffs] current damages." Henriksen at 49 (Emphasis in original).
Likewise, in the present case, Defendants will be prejudiced if denied the right to
defend themselves in an informed manner. Plaintiff objects to either allowing Defendants
(or the trial court, in an in camera review) to determine whether medical records are relevant.
She wants to be the "gate keeper" regarding her records, without judicial review. Clearly her
position is untenable.
The trial court was within its discretion to order Plaintiff to provide a list of her
providers and the treatment she received so a determination could be made by the court
whether the records are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
in this case.
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C.

The "reasonable certainty" standard sought by Plaintiff is inapplicable to
the present case and should not be applied by Utah courts in a personal
injury lawsuit.

Plaintiff cites State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 982 P.2 79, and T.W. v. State, 2006 Utah
App. 259, 139 P.3d 312, for the proposition that Defendants are required to show with
"reasonable certainty" that some evidence favorable to their defenses exists, before an in
camera review can occur. However, each of the cases cited by Plaintiff are distinguishable
from the present case before this court. Both the Cardall and T. W. v. State cases, supra, were
criminal matters involving the victims of sexual crimes. In Cardall, the defendant sought
to obtain a victim's psychological records, and understandably, the victim fought to have
these records kept private. The Cardall court held in order for the defendant to obtain these
records, he must show with "reasonable certainty" that the records contained favorable
evidence to the defense. Cardall, at ^ 28-30. Likewise, T. W. v. State involved charges of
unlawful sexual activity with a minor. The defendant in that case sought counseling records
of the minor victim. The Court held the defendant needed to establish with "reasonable
certainty" that the records contained information supporting defendant's defenses. The trial
court denied the defendant access to the victim's prior records. T. W. v. State, W 14-16.
In State v. Blake, 2000 Utah 113, % 19, 63 P.3d 56, the Utah Supreme Court discussed
what is necessary to prove "reasonable certainty" and stated "exactly how much is required
to satisfy the 'reasonable certainty' test of Cardall varies with each case . . ." The Blake
court continued, "the reasonable probability standard lies somewhere between "mere
possibility" and "more likely than not." . . .

On a similar spectrum, "reasonable certainty"

within the meaning of Cardall, lies on the more stringent side of "more likely than not."
Blake,\

19.
It is important to recognize that Cardall, T. W.y andBlake, all involved criminal sexual

charges and the extremely high standard necessary to even view the victim's records was
warranted because there is a strong public policy in favor of the privacy rights of victims of
sexual crimes.

The Court in Blake acknowledged that the precise parameters of the

"reasonable certainty" test would vary according to the particular circumstances of each case.
There are several other distinguishable differences between policy considerations
behind the "reasonable certainty" standard adopted by Utah courts in criminal cases, and
cases decided in a civil personal injury context. First, in a criminal case, it is the State,
(prosecutor) who brings the action; not the victim of the crime. In a civil personal injury
case, it is the plaintiff who voluntarily chooses to file suit against a defendant and places her
health condition in issue. Second, in a criminal case, the nexus between a criminal defendant
seeking medical records of a crime victim is not to disprove the victim's injuries, but to
impeach the victim's veracity. In civil personal injury case, the reason for a defendant
seeking plaintiff's medical records is to establish a pre-accident standard against which to
evaluate claimed injuries.
Finally, the "reasonable certainty" test is not practical in civil cases. In a civil context,
to require a party to show with "reasonable certainty" that favorable evidence exists prior to
an in camera review puts the cart before the horse. Defendants must be allowed, at a
minimum, to discover the identity of Plaintiff's prior medical providers and the treatment
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rendered by the providers in order to determine whether favorable evidence supporting
Defendant's defenses would likely be contained within the records. This is the very purpose
for which discovery is conducted. The trial court's Order for Plaintiff to disclose her medical
providers and the type of treatment rendered is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence" as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), and therefore,
was within the trial court's sound discretion.
Plaintiff has also referred to Debry v. Goates, 2000 Utah App. 58, U 26, 999 P.2d 582,
for the proposition that the "reasonable certainty" test should be required to determine if an
in camera review of plaintiff's medical records should be conducted to assess whether a
privilege exists. Plaintiff's Brief, p. 39. However, the Debry case involved a divorce action
(not a claim for personal injuries) in which the mental health of Mrs. Debry was put at issue
by her ex husband, not by Mrs. Debry. She had not placed her mental health in issue. She
had not voluntarily waived her privilege against disclosure by seeking damages for an alleged
impairment to her physical health. In the present case, Plaintiff has put her physical health,
as well as her employment history in issue by making bodily injury and economic loss claims
in this lawsuit.
The trial court's Order in the present case precisely complies with the procedural
requirements of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the reasoning of the
Sorenson case. The effect of the trial court's Order is to identify the requested documents
in such a manner so as to allow Defendants to assess whether the privilege or protection
would arguably apply. If a dispute remains concerning Defendants' receipt and review of

the records, the trial court agreed to conduct an in camera

inspection of the

requested/withheld records. Consistent with Rule 26, "other parties" (including the trial
court) are empowered to independently assess the applicability of the claim of privilege or
protection, rather than simply rely on the information Plaintiff chooses to disclose. The
Rules of Civil Procedure support the procedure outlined by the trial court in this case.
D.

The trial court set up multiple "safeguards" to protect Plaintiff's privacy
concerns in this case.

The trial court, in its Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Compel, properly
exercised its discretion and instituted safeguards which protect plaintiffs privacy concerns.
For Plaintiff to claim her prior medical records are not relevant to the present lawsuit
is absurd. Plaintiff's assertion that prior medical records not directly related to her alleged
crash injuries are not discoverable is likewise unfounded.
Records from a personal injury plaintiff's pre-accident providers would be important
to determine ongoing physical complaints (if any) and patient histories other than the specific
complaint a patient seeks treatment for during that specific visit. Most medical providers
typically have a "patient history questionnaire" which asks the patient to identify any prior
medical treatment received. These questionnaires which identify the health history of the
patient are relevant in showing the patient's prior medical condition. Therefore, Defendants'
request to obtain Plaintiff's pre-accident medical records is reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence and the trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion
to Compel.
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As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in Debry, supra, "The patient bears the burden
of establishing the applicability of the [physician-patient] privilege." Debry at ^ 16.
Therefore, in the present case, Plaintiff has the duty to establish a privilege applies to her
records and the trial court judge properly placed the burden on Plaintiff to demonstrate why
her records from her individual medical providers are protected by privilege. Plaintiff has
placed her physical condition at issue by filing the present lawsuit, yet refuses to cooperate
in disclosing her pre-accident medical providers and the type of treatment they rendered.
Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Either she must cooperate in discovery or Plaintiffs
personal injury claims must be dismissed.
E.

Permitting Defendants to obtain Plaintiff's medical records by signed
authorizations is not ex parte communication*

The proposed authorizations submitted to Plaintiff do not allow (and Defendants have
never suggested) Plaintiffs health care providers to unilaterally discuss Plaintiffs
Complaints with Defendants. The authorizations, when executed by Plaintiff, simply permit
the release of Plaintiff s medical records and do not provide Defendants with the right of exparte communication. No ex parte contact with Plaintiffs providers will take place. Should
Defendants determine it is necessary to discuss Plaintiff s medical treatment with her medical
providers, the depositions of these providers would be scheduled. Plaintiffs counsel would
be entitled to be present at the depositions.

i n

CONCLUSION
The documents (employment/medical records) sought by Defendants are relevant to
the claims made by the Plaintiff and the defenses asserted in this lawsuit. Against Plaintiffs
claims of privilege, the trial court appropriately exercised its judicial discretion in providing
a mechanism whereby the rights of both Plaintiff and Defendants would be protected. Based
upon the foregoing analysis, this Court should determine the trial court was within its broad
discretion to order Plaintiff to sign the medical records and employment records
authorizations. The holding of the Court of Appeals in Rahofy should be reversed.
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